[NukeNet] India Deal & NSG: Japanese NGOs speak out

[Citizens' Nuclear Information Center]

48 Japanese NGOs today submitted a petition to Prime Minister Koizumi 
calling on the Japanese government to oppose lifting Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Since NSG 
decisions are made by consensus, if Japan says "No", the sanctions will 
remain in place. For many reasons, including Japan's special position 
as the victim of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
opposition to the deal by Japan is likely to make it easier for other 
countries to voice their opposition too.

The petition, initiated by CNIC, was released at a press conference 
today in which representatives of the following groups presented their 
reasons for signing the petition:

Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
Femin Women's Democratic Club
Greenpeace Japan
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs
Japan Council against A & H Bombs
Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations
National Christian Council In Japan, Peace and Nuclear Issues Committee
Stop the Monju Tokyo

We encourage groups and individuals outside of Japan to also lobby the 
Japanese government (e.g. letters to the Japanese Ambassador) about 
this issue.

Philip White
International Liaison Officer

6 September 2006
Appeal to the Japanese Government
"Oppose lifting Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on nuclear trade 
with India"

We appeal to the Japanese government to resolutely oppose lifting 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) restrictions on nuclear trade with India 
for the following reasons:

1. In defiance of the global yearning for nuclear disarmament, India 
produced and tested nuclear weapons. Hitherto, India has followed its 
own path, pointing to the lack of effort towards nuclear disarmament on 
the part of the nuclear weapons states and to the inequality of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, as far as the international 
non-proliferation regime is concerned, there is no alternative to the 
NPT.

2. The proposed deal could send a dangerous message to other nuclear 
proliferators. Pakistan is already demanding the same treatment as 
India, while North Korea, Iran and other countries will conclude that 
if they once acquire nuclear weapons, eventually their possession of 
these weapons will gain international acceptance.

3. India is not a party to the NPT and it has not signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Furthermore, it has not joined 
the fissile material production moratorium and it has not played a 
constructive role in negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT). For its part, the US has not ratified the CTBT and it too has 
not played a constructive role in FMCT negotiations. The House 
legislation promotes a moratorium on the production of fissile material 
and the implementation of the FMCT as US policy. However, it lacks 
binding force on these points. The Japanese government calls for the 
speedy implementation of the CTBT and the FMCT and the universal 
application of the NPT, but the existing circumstances in regard to 
these treaties are unlikely to change under the proposed deal.

4. Under the proposed deal, India will accept safeguards on some of its 
nuclear facilities, but many nuclear facilities will be declared 
"military" and thus remain outside the scope of these safeguards. 
India's fast breeder reactors, uranium enrichment facilities and 
reprocessing facilities, which are of particular significance for 
nuclear proliferation, will not be covered by safeguards. It will 
therefore remain possible to produce fissile material and nuclear 
weapons at these facilities.

5. The possible supply of nuclear fuel to India would, in fact, add to 
its nuclear weapons capabilities by freeing-up its existing and limited 
domestic capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium 
exclusively for weapons.

6. The devastation which resulted from the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki gave Japan a deep insight into the inhumanity of nuclear 
weapons. This insight, gained through great suffering, confers upon 
Japan a special duty to work for non-proliferation and nuclear 
disarmament. Japan must not stand idly by when the principles of 
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are trampled upon with such 
contempt.

Petition was submitted to the Japanese government on 6 September 2006 
and was signed by 48 groups including the following:

Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
Chernobyl Children's Fund, Japan
Consumers Union of Japan
Depleted Uranium Center Japan
Femin Women's Democratic Club
Global Peace Campaign
Green Action
Greenpeace Japan
Harmonics Life Center
Humankind Survival Research Society
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs
Japan Council against A- and H-Bombs
Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations
National Christian Council In Japan, Peace and Nuclear Issues Committee
No Nukes Asia Forum Japan
Peace Boat
Stop the Monju Tokyo
YWCA of Japan

(Groups with no English name are not included on this list.)

Background
On July 26, 2006 the U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation 
to exempt a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with India from 
existing nuclear trade restrictions. The Senate is likely to pass 
similar legislation this Autumn. Before the nuclear cooperation 
agreement can become effective, the House legislation requires that the 
final text be submitted to Congress for approval.

The House legislation is a major step towards implementation of a July 
18, 2005 joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh, in 
which President Bush promised to work to lift US and international 
restrictions on nuclear trade with India.

Since India does not have comprehensive International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards covering all its nuclear activities and 
facilities, nuclear trade with India requires exemption from the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and also from the rules of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group of countries (NSG). The House legislation provides 
exemption from the Atomic Energy Act subject to various conditions. One 
of the conditions is that the NSG must decide by consensus to permit 
supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the 
NSG. That means lifting NSG restrictions on nuclear trade with India.

In order to be eligible for the exemption, the legislation also 
requires India to adopt certain nonproliferation measures. However, 
these measures fail to meet minimum nonproliferation standards. As 
shown in the following quote, the proposed agreement will, in fact, do 
great damage to the nonproliferation regime.

Twelve nuclear experts summed up the deal as follows in a letter to 
IAEA Director Mahomed ElBaradei:
"...the deal threatens to undermine the nonproliferation regime by 
granting India the benefits of civil nuclear commerce, while securing 
no meaningful constraint on the growth of India's nuclear weapons 
stockpile or requiring India to accept the equivalent of the 
nonproliferation obligations of Articles I and VI of the nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)."1

Two Indian and two Pakistani nuclear experts found that "the Bush-Singh 
proposal...would allow India not only to continue but also potentially 
to accelerate the buildup of its stockpile of weapons materials." 2 
They concluded that "the deal will enable India, should it choose to do 
so, to grow its stocks of weapons grade plutonium from the present rate 
of about 7 weapons worth a year to about 40-50 weapons worth a year." 
By giving India access to nuclear fuel from overseas, the proposed 
agreement will free up India's own limited supplies for use in nuclear 
weapons.

The legislation requires India to provide the U.S. and the IAEA with a 
credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, 
materials, and programs and to conclude a safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA. However, many key nuclear facilities will not be subject to 
safeguards.

Of India's 22 existing and under construction nuclear power reactors, 
it is proposed that only 14 will be subject to safeguards. However, 4 
of India's existing reactors and 2 reactors which are under 
construction are from overseas and their supply was conditional upon 
the application of safeguards anyway. Hence safeguards will be applied 
to only 50% (8 out of 16) of India's indigenous reactors. India's 
plutonium producing military reactors and its fast breeder reactors 
will not be subject to safeguards. Its uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities will also be exempt. Finally, India will retain 
the right to determine which future nuclear facilities it builds will 
be civilian and open to safeguards and which will not.

Clearly such a safeguards agreement will not prevent India from 
increasing its stock of nuclear weapons. Rather, it will enable India 
to continue to expand its supplies of unsafeguarded nuclear weapons 
material.

The other conditions that the House legislation imposes on India rely 
on subjective judgments, which will be made on the basis of the 
prevailing political circumstances. It can be expected that India's 
support for US geopolitical objectives in regard to Iran, Iraq and 
China, as well as its war against terror, will be prioritized over 
non-proliferation issues.

Japan's Influence as a Member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Bush-Singh joint statement and the legislation being considered in 
Congress show a careless disregard for the NPT. They are likely to 
great damage to the international nonproliferation regime. Fortunately, 
there is still a chance for more prudent countries to influence the 
outcome.

The NSG must decide whether to permit nuclear trade with India. So far 
Japan has not indicated that it supports the US on this issue. Since 
NSG decisions are made by consensus, Japan's voice on the NSG carries 
great weight. Furthermore, if Japan takes a stand, other countries will 
be encouraged to follow Japan's example.

References:
1. Experts Challenge IAEA Head's Statements on U.S.-Indian Nuclear 
Deal, July 24, 2006 "An Open Letter To Mohamed ElBaradei, 
Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency"
http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2006/20060724_ElBaradei_India.asp

2. "Fissile materials in South Asia and the implications of the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal: Draft report for the International Panel on 
Fissile Materials", by Z. Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. 
Ramana, 11 July 2006, pages 4,5.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/southasia.pdf

Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Bdg, 1-58-15, Higashi-Nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Phone: 81-3-5330-9520
Fax: 81-3-5330-9530
http://cnic.jp/english/
cnic at nifty.com