[NukeNet] The perils of non-proliferation amnesia

[Bill Smirnow]

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Harsh Kapoor
To: saan_ at yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, August 31, 2007 8:10 PM
Subject: [abolition-caucus] The perils of non-proliferation amnesia

   Asians Against Nukes
September 1, 2007
URL: http://www.groups.yahoo.com/group/SAAN_/message/1055

o o o o

The Hindu
Sep 01, 2007

The perils of non-proliferation amnesia

by William C. Potter and Jayantha Dhanapala

The India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, if endorsed by the NSG and the U.S.
Congress, will virtually ensure the demise of global nuclear export
restraints.

Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation means different things to different people - a
reversal of decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy, a promising new market
for U.S. nuclear commerce, violation of the fundamental principles of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the prospect of a strategic
partnership among vibrant democracies.

One thing it definitely does not mean is strengthened export controls.
Despite efforts by the White House to portray the deal as a plus for
combating the spread of nuclear weapons, the terms of the latest round of
U.S.-Indian nuclear negotiations confirm the opposite conclusion. Repeatedly
outfoxed by their Indian counterparts and hindered by the political
unwillingness of a lame-duck administration to walk away from the
negotiations, U.S. diplomats have achieved an embarrassing accord. If
endorsed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the U.S. Congress, it will
virtually ensure the demise of global nuclear export restraints.

The next key round of deliberations on the deal is apt to take place this
fall among the 45-member NSG - a body that only three years ago was urged by
President Bush to tighten export controls, especially in the sensitive fuel
cycle area. Today, however, Washington has a different agenda that closely
resembles the one Russia had long sought (and the U.S. had opposed) - to
create an exception for India to standard export guidelines that preclude
the supply of nuclear material and technology to states lacking safeguards
on all of their nuclear facilities. As a result of this shift in U.S.
policy, Russia already has rushed to sign new nuclear trade agreements with
India without waiting for the NSG to modify its guidelines by consensus as
is required. China also has indicated its intent to apply a similar
exception to Pakistan, and one can soon imagine Australia, Belarus, France,
South Africa, and other states citing the NSG precedent for India as the
basis for exporting nuclear commodities to anyone whenever it is
commercially or politically expedient.

What is perhaps most unusual and ominous about the current debate over India
within the NSG is the extent to which economic considerations appear to
override those involving proliferation even among states that are typically
regarded as the leaders of the international non-proliferation community.
Apparently, gone are the days when Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South
Africa, Sweden, and members of the European Union could be counted on to
lead the charge in support of strict adherence to non-proliferation
treaties.

At the historic 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which extended the
Treaty indefinitely, NPT parties - including all members of the NSG - made a
political commitment to refrain from nuclear cooperation with states lacking
"full scope" safeguards. And yet, most of these states either are unaware of
these obligations or have chosen to ignore them.
Striking dissonance

The dissonance is most striking with respect to Australia and South Africa -
two countries that pride themselves on model non-proliferation behaviour -
reflected in part by their ratification of nuclear-weapon-free zones in
their respective regions, the Treaty of Raratonga in the South Pacific and
the Pelindaba Treaty in Africa. Both treaties have explicit language
prohibiting members from engaging in nuclear commerce with states lacking
comprehensive safeguards, as is the case in India. And yet Australia and
South Africa have each endorsed nuclear trade with India and are supportive
of the U.S. initiative to weaken the NSG guidelines to allow such commerce.
It is as if they believe they can selectively disavow inconvenient
legally-binding obligations - a particularly difficult manoeuvre for
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who is on record as having
acknowledged the restrictive nature of the Raratonga Treaty.

It remains to be seen if the current subordination of non-proliferation
objectives to economic and other considerations will be a fleeting
phenomenon or a more enduring fact of international politics. However, it is
disconcerting that the decision about nuclear trade with India in some
capitals has been made by officials who do not have expertise in or
responsibility for non-proliferation matters and who have little regard for
its proliferation implications. This is the case in Canada and the U.S., and
appears to resemble the process by which decisions were reached in many EU
countries, as well as other members of the NSG.

Export controls remain an imperfect but useful tool to curb the spread of
nuclear weapons. In this regard, the NSG would be well advised to follow
Florence Nightingale's guiding principle that "whatever else hospitals do
they should not spread disease." Otherwise, at a time of mounting
proliferation challenges, this body is apt to adopt a policy that
intentionally or inadvertently erodes the effectiveness of one of the most
important multilateral non-proliferation instruments.

(William Potter is Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Jayantha
Dhanapala is a former U.N. Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs
and Ambassador of Sr i Lanka to the United States, who served as president
of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.)

____________

SOUTH ASIANS AGAINST NUKES (SAAN):
An informal information platform for activists and scholars concerned about
the dangers of Nuclearisation in South Asia

SAAN Website:
http://www.s-asians-against-nukes.org
or
http://perso.orange.fr/sacw/saan/

SAAN Mailing List:
To subscribe send a blank message to: saan_-subscribe at yahoogroups.com
________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SAAN compilers.