[NukeNet] US-India Nuclear Deal: IAEA must insist on proper nuclear safeguards

[Citizens' Nuclear Information Center]

Media Release
(10 September 2007)

IAEA must insist on proper nuclear safeguards in India

The US-India Deal Working Group of Abolition 2000, a global network of  
over 2000 organizations in more than 90 countries working for a global  
treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, today urged the Board of Governors  
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to require that any  
negotiations on a new safeguards agreement with India be consistent  
with current IAEA standards and policies, the Non-Proliferation Treaty,  
and with UN Security Council rulings. The letter is available on the  
following web page:

http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindiafiles/ 
iaealet10sep07.html

As part of the US-India nuclear deal, India must negotiate a safeguards  
agreement with the IAEA. India wishes these talks to cover the eight  
nuclear facilities that India has declared as "civilian" as part of its  
agreement with the United States (the US-India nuclear deal). The  
Coordinator of the Abolition 2000 Working Group, Philip White, said,  
"Any safeguards agreement that covers only the nuclear facilities India  
chooses to include would violate the comprehensive (full-scope)  
safeguards standard that is applied to all states other than NPT  
nuclear weapon states. It would mean the IAEA going against its  
previous decisions and those of the UN Security Council."

The US-India deal will enable India to increase production of fissile  
materials for nuclear weapons. Mr. White said "Bringing additional  
Indian facilities under safeguards will not contribute in any  
significant way to stopping this, as long as India maintains fissile  
material production and nuclear weapons-related facilities outside of  
safeguards."

There is concern that India might seek 'India specific safeguards' that  
make the safeguards contingent upon the continued supply of nuclear  
fuel from foreign suppliers. Mr. White said, "There is no precedent for  
dropping safeguards if nuclear fuel supplies are interrupted."

The most likely reason why fuel supplies to India would be interrupted  
under the proposed arrangement is if India conducts a nuclear weapon  
test explosion. India has insisted on a right to conduct further  
nuclear tests. This is despite a unanimous UN Security Council  
Resolution 1172 (6 June 1998) that demanded India not conduct further  
nuclear tests and that it should join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test  
Ban Treaty. IAEA General Conference Resolution GC(42)/RES/19 (25  
September 1998) called on India (and Pakistan) to "become Parties to  
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, without delay and without  
conditions." This resolution also obliges all IAEA member states to  
support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1172.

Mr. White said that "The world has rejected nuclear testing and India  
should not be permitted to test and pay no price for it."

Contact:
Philip White, Coordinator of Abolition 2000's US-India Deal Working  
Group

c/- Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo, Japan
Tel: 81-3-3357-3800 Fax: 81-3-3357-3801
Email 1: white at cnic.jp Email 2: cnic at nifty.com
Working Group Web Site:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html

----------------

TO: The Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency

We write as members of the US-India Deal Working Group of ABOLITION  
2000, a global network of over 2000 organizations in more than 90  
countries working for a global treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons1. We  
wish to convey our concerns about the proposed negotiation of a  
safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA pertaining to the eight  
nuclear facilities that India has declared as "civilian" as part of its  
agreement with the United States (the US-India nuclear deal).

Our concerns are outlined below.


1. The US-India Nuclear Deal

This safeguards agreement would facilitate a nuclear supply initiative  
that is deeply flawed, not least because it contradicts the full-scope  
safeguards standard that has been established in the context of the  
NPT, NSG, Treaty of Rarotonga, and Treaty of Pelindaba. IAEA member  
states must not allow themselves to be used to lend legitimacy to an  
arrangement that would compromise the full-scope safeguards regime they  
have worked so long to construct.

 
2. "India-specific Safeguards"

The proposed US-India agreement for nuclear cooperation (the '123  
Agreement', 3 August 2007) refers to an "India-specific Safeguards  
Agreement" (Article 10). The IAEA should not approve a safeguards  
agreement which affords India any special privileges.

There is concern that India might seek "India specific safeguards" that  
make the safeguards contingent upon the continued supply of nuclear  
fuel from foreign suppliers. There is no precedent for dropping  
safeguards if nuclear fuel supplies are interrupted. The Board of  
Governors should require that safeguards on Indian nuclear facilities  
be permanent and consistent with IAEA standards and practices.

The most likely reason why fuel supplies to India would be interrupted  
under the proposed arrangement is if India conducts a nuclear weapon  
test explosion. Any such test would amount to an Indian rejection of  
the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 demand that India not conduct  
further nuclear tests and that it should join the Comprehensive Nuclear  
Test Ban Treaty. IAEA General Conference Resolution GC(42)/RES/19 (25  
September 1998) called on India (and Pakistan) to "become Parties to  
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, without delay and without  
conditions." Furthermore, this resolution obliges all IAEA member  
states to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution  
1172.
See the following links to the UN Security Council and IAEA General  
Conference Resolutions:
 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/ 
1172%20(1998)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC

http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC42/Resolutions/gc42res19.html

3. Partial Safeguards In Context

It has been argued by some that bringing additional Indian  
electricity-producing reactors under safeguards is a major step forward  
for nonproliferation. It is not.

So long as India maintains fissile material production and nuclear  
weapons-related facilities outside of safeguards, safeguards on  
additional electricity producing reactors are hardly worth their  
estimated annual cost of $10 million (USD). It is clear that if Nuclear  
Supplier Group states (or others) agree to supply India with uranium  
for its safeguarded reactors, this will free-up India's limited  
indigenous supplies for the purpose of plutonium and highly enriched  
uranium production and allow it to increase production of these fissile  
materials2. If supplier states agree to transfer sensitive nuclear  
technologies to Indian safeguarded facilities, the comprehensive  
safeguards system is ill-equipped to prevent the possible replication  
and use of such technologies in India's unsafeguarded military sector.

India has made clear also that it will only agree to Additional  
Protocol safeguards on the facilities that would be on its "civilian"  
list. The Board of Governors should obtain a detailed clarification  
from India and the Director General on the nature and form of the  
Additional Protocol agreement that India will pursue before it  
considers any other safeguards agreement for India. IAEA member states  
should require that the Additional Protocol be applied and implemented  
so as to prevent the misuse of any nuclear equipment or material that  
India imports.


Conclusion

In view of the above concerns, we urge you to ensure that there is no  
rush to judgment in the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between  
India and the IAEA. The goal of the Board of Governors during the  
negotiations should be to ensure that the US-India deal comply fully  
with current international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation  
agreements, principles, and norms.

Philip White, US-India Deal Working Group Coordinator
Steven Staples, Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000

10 September 2007


Notes and References

1. The US-India Deal Working Group was established at ABOLITION 2000's  
Annual General Meeting, May 2007, Vienna. The website for the group is  
as follows:  
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html

2. Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India  
Nuclear Deal, by Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana,  
International Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report #1, September  
2006, http://www.ipfmlibrary/rr01.pdf


Endorsed by Members of Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group

Lisa Clark (Italy), Beati i costruttori di pace (Blessed Are the  
Peacemakers) and Italian Disarmament Network

Beatrice Fihn (Sweden), Womens' International League for Peace and  
Freedom

Shelagh Foreman (USA), Massachusetts Peace Action

Jim Green (Australia), Friends of the Earth Australia

Regina Hagen (Germany), International Network of Engineers and  
Scientists Against Proliferation

Xanthe Hall (Germany), International Physicians for the Prevention of  
Nuclear War

John Hallam (Australia), People for Nuclear Disarmament NSW - Nuclear  
Flashpoints

David Heller (Belgium), Friends of the Earth Flanders & Brussels

Hidemichi Kano (Japan), Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs

Akira Kawasaki (Japan), Peace Boat

Ak Malten (The Netherlands), Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance

Nouri Abdul Razzak Hussain (Egypt), Secretary-General, Afro-Asian  
Peoples' Solidarity Organization

Sukla Sen (India), National Coordination Committee Member, Coalition  
for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace

Hari P. Sharma (Canada), Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Simon Fraser  
University and President,

SANSAD (South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy)

Steven Staples (Canada), Director, Rideau Institute on International  
Affairs, Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000

Heinz Stockinger (Austria), PLAGE - Independent Platform Against  
Nuclear Dangers

Aaron Tovish (USA), International Manager, Mayors for Peace 2020 Vision  
Campaign

David Webb (UK), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Gunnar Westberg (Sweden), International Physicians for the Prevention  
of Nuclear War

Philip White (Japan), Citizens' Nuclear Information Center


Working Group Contact Address:
c/- Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5, Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: 03-3357-3800 Fax: 03-3357-3801
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html